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NOTE: CAGLE v. BOYLE MORTGAGE CO.
Plaintiff, Boyle Mortgage Co., sued to foreclose a mortgage
given by defendant Cagle to secure a construction note. The note
for $28,000 recited a face value of 10% interest per annum. Cagle
asserted the defense of usury on the grounds that the computerized
monthly statements sent to him from Boyle's home office showed
that the interest had been compounded monthly and yielded an
effective interest rate of 10.471% per annum. In addition to this, the
computerized statement showed that Boyle had computed the daily
interest factor based on a 360-day year for 365 days of charging. The
use of a daily interest factor based on a 365/360 computation yielded
a 10.139% effective interest rate. The use of both methods produced
a simple interest rate of 10.623529% per annum. Boyle argued that
the transaction was free of usury because there had been a mistake
of fact in the calculation of the interest, and there was no intent to
exact an illegal rate of interest. The chancellor found the transac-
tion free of usury. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and held
that the transaction was usurious. The note and mortgage were
cancelled. Cagle v. Boyle Mortgage Co., 261 Ark. 437, 549 S.W.2d
474 (1977).
The Arkansas constitution states that "[aill contracts' for a
greater rate of interest than ten per cent per annum shall be void,
as to principal and interest, and the General Assembly shall pro-
hibit the same by law; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon,
the rate shall be six percent per annum."2 This provision is com-
1. "All contracts include bonds, bills, notes and all other contracts, verbal or written,
whereby a rate of interest greater than ten per centum per annum is reserved, taken or
secured, or agreed to be taken or reserved, as fully and completely as if they had been
severally and particularly enumerated in the constitution and declared void." German Bank
v. DeShon, 41 Ark. 331, 341 (1883).
2. Ark. Const. art. 19, § 13. All contracts that are found to be usurious are void as to
the principal and interest. The title to property used to secure a usurious contract is absolute
in the borrower. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 473-74, 308 S.W.2d 802, 808
(1958). If the borrower voluntarily pays the entire contract price, however, he may only
recover the excess interest he paid. Harris v. McCann, 229 Ark. 972, 983, 319 S.W.2d 832,
838 (1959). One cannot purge a usurious contract by a retroactive correction or a subsequent
disclaimer. First Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 249 Ark. 972, 977, 463 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1971);
Holland v. C.T. Doan Buick Co., 228 Ark. 340, 342, 307 S.W.2d 538, 539 (1957). However,
the taint of usury may be removed where the lender made a mistake of fact. Davidson v.
Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 129, 499 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1973).
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monly referred to as a usury law. The term "usury" is ordinarily
defined as an excessive charge for the loan or forbearance of money.'
It has been stated by the Arkansas Supreme Court in dictum
that the facts and circumstances existing at the instant the contract
is consummated determine whether the contract is usurious;' how-
ever, this statement has mainly been used to discredit a lender's
attempt to purge the contract of usury after it has been discovered
by the borrower.' All attendant circumstances germane to the trans-
action in question will be considered by the court,' and the sub-
stance, rather than the form, of the transaction is scrutinized.7 The
test for usury is a comparison of the amount the borrower is required
to pay with the total amount he could be required to pay at a
maximum rate of interest for the term, using the statutory system
of applying payments first to interest and the excess to the princi-
pal.8
In order for a contract to be usurious, there must be an inten-
tion to take or reserve more than 10% interest per annum for the
loan or forbearance of money;' there need not be an actual intent
to violate the statute or constitution. 0 The Arkansas Supreme Court
has held that the statutory offense of usury neither requires that
there be a corrupt bargain" nor does it require that there be a
concurrence of intent by the parties.
12
In order for one to determine whether a contract is usurious, one
must understand the term "interest." Interest may be defined as the
difference between the principal of the loan and the face amount of
the contract. 3 It is an amount of money charged for the forbearance
or extension of time for the payment of the principal balance of the
loan. 4 The nominal interest rate recited in the contract may not be
3. Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Knight, 237 Ark. 802, 803, 376 S.W.2d 556, 557 (1964).
4. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 469, 308 S.W.2d 802, 806 (1958). But
see Harris v. McCann, 229 Ark. 972, 976, 319 S.W.2d 832, 836 (1959).
5. Gen. Contract Corp. v. Duke, 223 Ark. 938, 941, 270 S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (1954).
6. Textron, Inc. v. Whitener, 249 Ark. 57, 59, 458 S.W.2d 367, 368 (1970).
7. Hare v. Gen. Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952); Arm-
strong v. McCluskey, 188 Ark. 406, 65 S.W.2d 558 (1933).
8. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 68-606 (Repl. 1957). See Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip.
Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 131, 499 S.W.2d 68, 70 (1973).
9. Garvin v. Linton, 62 Ark. 370, 376, 35 S.W. 430, 432 (1896). See also Siebert v. Hall,
63 F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 1933).
10. Holland v. C.T. Doan Buick Co., 228 Ark. 340, 343, 307 S.W.2d 538, 540 (1957).
11. Garvin v. Linton, 62 Ark. 370, 378, 35 S.W. 430, 432 (1896).
12. Id. at 376, 35 S.W. at 432. But see Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v. Chandler, 328
Ark. 966, 971, 239 S.W.2d 1009, 1012 (1951); Armstrong v. McCluskey, 188 Ark. 406, 410, 65
S.W.2d 558, 559 (1933) (dictum).
13. Andrews v. Martin, 245 Ark. 1010, 1012, 436 S.W.2d 285, 288 (1969).
14. Pacific Indus., Inc. v. Mountain Inn, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
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the effective rate which a borrower actually pays. Some lenders
calculate interest by the use of a 360/360 daily interest factor com-
putation. 5 When this method is used, the lender is assuming that
there are thirty days in each month, twelve months in a year, and
360 days in a year." In determining the daily interest factor, the
total annual percent interest charged is divided by 360.1 The
monthly factor is determined by multiplying the daily factor by
thirty, regardless of how many actual days there are in that particu-
lar month;' 8 therefore, the monthly interest factor is the same for
each month in the year. The effect of using a 360/360 computation
is that the effective annual rate of interest is the same as that which
is recited by the contract;" however, the interest charged for a par-
ticular month such as February may be greater than that which
would be charged if the lender were using a 365/365 computation. 0
When one uses a 365/360 computation to determine the daily inter-
est factor, the annual percentage rate being charged is divided by
360 to determine the daily interest rate.2' The daily factor is then
multiplied by the exact number of days in the month to determine
the amount of interest to be charged for that month."
The term "compound interest" refers to a method whereby the
unpaid accrued interest on the balance due is added to the principal
amount of the obligation and thus becomes part of the total amount
on which interest for the next payment is calculated. 3 The use of
compound interest may render a contract usurious if such com-
pounding effectively raises the annual interest rate above 10%.24
However, it has been held that parties may lawfully agree that the
unpaid interest on a note calling for 10% annual interest, payable
in twelve monthly installments, shall become part of the principal
at the end of the year and bear the same rate of interest thereon.25






20. The monthly factor on a note calling for 10% interest as calculated by the 360/360
method would be .008331 for all months, including February. A monthly factor determined
by the 365/365 method for the month of February would be .0076692 on a 10% note. This factor
is multiplied by the unpaid principal balance to determine the interest charge for the month.
21. Silverstein v. Shadow Lawn Say. & Loan Ass'n., 51 N.J. 30, -, 237 A.2d 474, 477
(1968).
22. Id.
23. Grider v. Driver, 46 Ark. 50, 51 (1885).
24. Id. (dictum).
25. Carney v. Matthewson, 86 Ark. 25, 27, 109 S.W. 1024 (1908). See also Phipps-
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Another method of calculating interest used by lenders to exact
interest in excess of that recited by the contract is called discount-
ing. This method may be illustrated by a lender who contracts to
loan to a borrower $1000 at 10% per annum interest. Instead of
giving the borrower $1000, he may discount the note by reserving
$100 (10%) at the outset. Borrower receives $900 and when the note
falls due, he pays the full $1000. He has thus paid $100 for the use
of $900 for a year. The true or effective rate of interest is 11.1% per
annum.
26
Another method of interest calculation in which a difference
between the nominal rate and the effective rate arises is the addition
of interest to the principal amount of an obligation to be repaid in
installments. When the "add-on" method is used, the lender calcu-
lates the dollar amount of interest to be exacted over the entire life
of the loan. The interest is then added to the principal amount of
the debt and becomes part of the principal obligation. The amount
of each installment is determined by dividing the total amount to
be paid by the total number of installments 7.2 The borrower is re-
quired to pay interest over the entire life of the loan on the total
amount of the obligation even though he is reducing the principal
with each installment paid.28 For example, a $2000 loan payable in
thirty-six monthly installments at 8% annual interest, would be
evidenced by a note for $2480.29 If the note were paid according to
its terms, the lender would receive a true interest rate 9f 15.57% per
annum .0
The correct way to calculate interest when the borrower is re-
ducing the principal by installments is specified in the Arkansas
statutes:
[Tihe interest shall be calculated to the time when the first
payment shall have been made, and such payment shall be applied
to the payment of such interest; and if such payment exceed the
interest, the balance shall be applied to diminish the principal,
and the same course shall be used in all subsequent payments; but
in no case when a payment shall fall short of paying the interest
due at the time of making such payment shall the balance of such
interest be added to the principal."
Reynolds Co. v. Mcllroy Bank and Trust Co., 197 Ark. 621, 124 S.W.2d 222 (1939). Cf. Daniels
v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 315, 351 S.W.2d 853 (1962).





31. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 68-606 (Repl. 1957).
19781
UALR LAW JOURNAL
A contract that recites a face value of 10% interest may be
rendered usurious by the court's characterization of a service or
finance charge as interest.2 In such a contract, the service charge is
included in the principal amount of the loan on which the 10%
interest is computed. The court's characterization of a service
charge as interest turns on whether the charge inures to the benefit
of the lender rather than to the benefit of the borrower.13 The court
will look beyond mere labels affixed to charges; thus, a meaningless
label attached to such a charge does nothing to validate it." The
court may assume until it is convinced by proof to the contrary that
the difference between the principal of the loan and the face amount
of the contract represents interest on the debt.35
In a like manner, a "carrying charge," "time-price differen-
tial," "finance charge," or "service charge" added to the cash price
of merchandise sold on credit may be viewed as interest and thus
render the contract void for usury.36 It has been held that the addi-
tion of the pro rata share of overhead to the principal of a loan is
the addition of interest.3 7 Similarly, a bonus added to the principal
is viewed as interest if the bonus inures to the benefit of the lender's
agent.
3 1
On the other hand, a service charge based in whole or in part
on services rendered for the benefit of the borrower is viewed as a
legitimate addition to the principal even though the named com-
pensation may be greater than that which is usually paid for serv-
ices of the same kind.3 9 There is a divergence of authority on the
question of whether the discount of a note in Arkansas with general
endorsement for a sum in excess of 10% annual interest constitutes
usury."
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that an honest error of
calculation will not render a contract usurious." If the lender by
32. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958); Hare v. Gen.
Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 607-10, 249 S.W.2d 973, 977-78 (1952) (caveat).
33. Smith v. Eason, 223 Ark. 747, 750, 268 S.W.2d 389, 390 (1954).
34. Harris v. McCann, 229 Ark. 972, 977, 319 S.W.2d 832, 835 (1959) (dictum).
35. Id. See also Jones v. Jones, 227 Ark. 836, 838, 301 S.W.2d 737, 738 (1957).
36. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958). See also Hare
v. Gen. Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 607-10, 249 S.W.2d 973, 977-78 (1952) (ca-
veat).
37. Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 220 Ark. 565, 574, 249 S.W.2d 307, 311 (1952).
38. Smith v. Eason, 223 Ark. 747, 750, 268 S.W.2d 389, 390-91 (1954).
39. Siebert v. Hall, 63 F.2d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 1933).
40. Haley v. Greenshaw, 235 Ark. 481, 486, 360 S.W.2d 753, 756 (1962). But see First
Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 374 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (E.D. Ark. 1974). See generally Hare v. Gen.
Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
41. Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 129, 499 S.W.2d 68, 69
[Vol. I
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mistake of fact, by error in calculation, or by inadvertence in the
insertion of an incorrect date contracts to receive an illegal rate of
interest, such mistake, error, or inadvertence will not stamp the
contract with the taint of usury.4" However, when the lender uses the
wrong interest rate in computing the amount of interest to be
charged, he commits a mistake of law that will not be forgiven. 3
Similarly, if the lender charges 10% annual interest on the outstand-
ing principal on the same day each year regardless of when the
advances were made, he has made a mistake of law that renders the
contract usurious.44 A lender may not assume for the purpose of
computing interest that there are four weeks in every month and
thus charge the borrower 10% interest based on a forty-eight week
year. The lender is charged with knowledge of a fifty-two week
year.45
The Arkansas Supreme Court held in Cagle that the use of a
365/360 daily interest factor computation in addition to the use of a
compound monthly interest charge rendered the contruction note
that. recited 10% annual interest void for usury.46 It is implicit in the
opinion that either method alone would have rendered the contract
void for usury because each method raised the effective annual in-
terest rate above 10%.11
Boyle Mortgage Company argued that there was no intent to
collect a usurious rate of interest since the note recited a face value
of 10% annual interest.4 8 The court was not persuaded by this
argument because Boyle's monthly statements showed a computa-
tion of interest above the legal rate." It was significant that in a
companion transaction with Cagle, Boyle collected the principal
and interest on the loan in accordance with the monthly statements
that had been sent to Cagle."
(1973); Whiddon v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 227 Ark. 824, 826, 301 S.W.2d 567, 568
(1957).
42. Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 129, 499 S.W.2d 68, 69
(1973).
43. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Catalani, 238 Ark. 561, 564, 383 S.W.2d 99, 101 (1964).
Lender believed that 10.5% interest was the maximum legal rate in Arkansas.
44. Brooks v. Burgess, 228 Ark. 150, 153, 306 S.W.2d 104, 106 (1957).
45. Holland v. C.T. Doan Buick Co., 228 Ark. 340, 344, 307 S.W.2d 538, 540 (1957).
46. Cagle v. Boyle Mortgage Co., 261 Ark. 437, 440, 549 S.W.2d 474, 475 (1977).
47. Id. at 439, 549 S.W.2d at 475.





Boyle also argued that it made a mistake of fact in the calcula-
tion of the interest and that the note and mortgage should be en-
forced according to its provisions." The court discounted this argu-
ment, stating that it was not convinced that the monthly state-
ments were mere mathematical errors in calculation.2 The court
cited two mistake of law cases to support the proposition that math-
ematical errors which are caused by a misconception of Arkansas
law will not be forgiven.53 It therefore seems that the Arkansas Su-
preme Court based its holding in Cagle upon a finding that Boyle's
calculation of interest was induced by a mistake of law which was
not forgivable.
Cagle is important because it is the first Arkansas case to deal
with the 365/360 daily interest factor computation. The case implic-
itly held that any contract that recites a 10% simple interest rate
will be held void for usury if the 365/360 method of computation of
daily interest is used. It is significant to note that the holding in
Cagle is not expressly limited to long-term contracts.
States other than Arkansas have ruled on this matter but have
distinguished between long-term and short-term contracts. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 365/360 computation of
daily interest may not be used to calculate interest on loans that are
to extend beyond a period of one year; however, that court sanc-
tioned the use of 365/360 daily interest factor for short-term loans
(less than one year) as a part of the custom and usage of lending
institutions."
The Mississippi Supreme Court held in 1840 that the 365/360
method of computing daily interest would not render a contract that
recited the maximum legal rate of interest usurious." This rule was
reaffirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in 19386 because of
the long reliance of the commercial world upon the rule that was
stated in 1840.11 The reaffirmance was also based on the fact that
Mississippi has a statute authorizing the use of a 360-day year when
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id., citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Catalani, 238 Ark. 561, 383 S.W.2d 99 (1964);
Brooks v. Burgess, 228 Ark. 150, 306 S.W.2d 104 (1957).
54. Silverstein v. Shadow Lawn Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 51 N.J. 30, -, 237 A.2d 474, 479
(1968).
55. Planter's Bank v. Snodgrass, 4 How. 573 (Miss. 1840).
56. Dickey v. Bank of Clarksdale, 183 Miss. 748, 184 So. 314 (1938).
57. Id. at -, 184 So. at 316.
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computing interest for fractional parts of the year. The Mississippi
Supreme Court stated that what is nonusurious for a fractional part
of the year, such as 360 days, should be good as to a whole year, 365
days:
If the note [for $1500] had been made for 180 days, 4% inter-
est could have been lawfully collected on the completion of the 180
days, and a renewal taken for another 180 days, at the end of which
time another 4% interest could have been lawfully collected, mak-
ing 8% or $120 at the end of 360 days; and then the note could have
been renewed for 5 days and $1.67 in interest could have been
collected, making the total interest of $121.67 for the 365 days."
An argument similar to the one made by the Mississippi court
could be made in Arkansas because title 68, section 605 of Arkansas
Statutes Annotated" authorizes the use of a 360-day year when
computing interest for fractional parts of the year. It states that
"[flor the purpose of calculating interest, a month shall be consid-
ered the twelfth part of a year, and as consisting of thirty (30) days;
and interest for any number of days less than a month, shall be
estimated by the proportion which such number of days shall bear
to thirty (30)."10 Although the Arkansas Supreme Court did not
consider the effect of Cagle on this statute, it is possible that the
statute will be held to be unconstitutional because of the holding
in Cagle. It might therefore be wise for lenders who are relying on
this statute to change their method of computing daily interest to
365/365. Likewise, the use of a 360/360 daily interest factor may
cause some contracts reciting a 10% annual interest to exceed the
legal rate.
The decision in Cagle affects every lender and "credit seller"
of merchandise who has relied upon the 365/360 method of calculat-
ing a daily interest factor on contracts reciting a 10% simple inter-
est. The impact is clear: All such contracts are void as to principal
and interest. A mistake of law is no defense. Lender beware!
Margaret Osborn Keet
58. Id. at -, 184 So. at 315.
59. (Repl. 1957).
60. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 68-605 (Repl. 1957).
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